Του Βουχιούνη Νικόλαου , Διεθνολόγου
Παρασκευή 2 Σεπτεμβρίου 2011
The Hebrew state , since its creation in the aftermath of World War 2 , has relied on the use of military force and unilateral actions to secure its existence – first and foremost – and its prosperity from the surrounding Arab states and the various terrorist as well as resistance organizations that surfaced as threats . The israeli strategy worked wonders , making the tiny state a decisive international actor in the Middle East . That assumption does not mean that it became the dominant actor in the area but the point is that Israel achieved its prime objectives . It managed to sign peace treaties with its neighbours and kept the non-state actors attacks at a minimum . So the objectives of territorial integrity and economic advancement were secured to a large extent . However that strategy has its limits and the decision makers are always prone to avoiding changes in a successful security policy due to criticism\election concerns .
The belief that you alone can shape the status quo in your geopolitical environment is a trait that emanates from a self-perception as great power / super power , which Israel is not . The Jewish homeland continues , half a century after its official declaration , to remain a security consumer . Its offensive capabilities are directly dependent on american military aid , just as its diplomatic choices are a by-product of the mobilization of the jewish diaspora (especially in the USA) . With the wisdom and certainty of the historical distance we must admit the validity and the lack of alternatives that shaped Israel’s national security strategy . The problem is that the military aspects marginalize diplomatic relations , as a non-preferable issue-solving method . Furthermore they prevent the total normalization of interstate relationships , thus undermining the fulfillment of the secondary objectives of Israel , which are stable/permanent peace and further development of the economy , mainly through the tourist sector .
By concentrating on the (often disproportional) use of force , affecting more the civilian lives and the economic/social infrastructure than the militants , Israel fails to undermine the ideology and the rhetoric of the extremists . On the contrary , it legitimizes their claims of aggression and pushes ordinary citizens , who have lost members of their family in Israeli counter-attacks , towards the terrorists ranks . The quality of life , that is the ability to provide the minimum acceptable necessities to your family and enjoy a peaceful life , are essential for the democratic transition of a society and the disavowal of religious fanaticism and racial hate . Blind violence thrives in misery and persons who feel that their life is a living hell , full of human loss-poverty-stagnation , are already in an emotional state that does not prioritize living over dying as soldier or martyr .
Last but not least , the militarization of the respective societies continues the cycle of violence and prevents the conflict’s resolution . It could be characterized as a low intensity conflict , but it remains an ongoing conflict nonetheless . The main adversaries of the conflict are Israelis and Palestinians , even though it would be fairly accurate to include the Lebanese organization Hezbollah at the Palestinian’s side . For the Israeli citizens the burden is mostly psychological – a feeling of insecurity , a fear of random attacks that disrupts their everyday lives and does not allow them to reach their full potential in any economic or social activity . For the Palestinians the burden is , as described above , both psychological and material .
The reason I decided to concentrate on Israel’s national security strategy is because Palestine is not yet a state and , even if there is a unilateral declaration of statehood in the future , the fact that the West Bank is governed by Fatah while the Gaza Strip is controlled by Hamas leaves little hope for common initiatives or a significant breakthrough in the peace process . On the other hand , Israel is the powerful player in the equation and no international mediation will accomplish a fruitful arrangement without its consent .
In my opinion , Israel should avoid coercing changes on the ground and abide by the United Nations Resolutions on the relevant matters . For decades among the political and military elite of Tel Aviv circulated the thought that through settlements / repopulation measures and military occupation of small borderline patches of earth Israel could bolster its negotiating position and also establish buffer zones . It is undisputable that the above tactic neither changed the peace process agenda nor reduced the frequency of violent incidents . By balancing the use of force (as deterrent) with the international norms and customary law Israel will gain legitimacy , which will strengthen the moderate voices between the Palestinians . In that regard , the Israeli leadership will sooner or later have to commence negotiations with Hamas , since it represents a sizeable portion of the Palestinian population . Indirect communication – through state-actors or even internationally renowned personalities as facilitators – is a means to that end . Better yet , Israel could have direct talks with Hamas , which would require de jure recognition of its already de facto role in the Gaza Strip in exchange for explicit acceptance of the Jewish state along the pre-1964 border arrangement .
As far as the Palestinians territories are concerned , Tel Aviv could easily monitor (with the cooperation of Egypt and even the presence of United Nations peacekeepers) the flow of goods and economic aid . In case of dual use technology and materials that may be used for improvised weapons or explosive devices , Israel should either confiscate the shipments or – together with an international agency – supervise the recipients which should be designated Fatah (or , less preferably , Hamas) officials , in order to be able to pass judgment and accountability in case of misuse . I think that it is self-explanatory that military expenditures are out of the question . West Bank and Gaza Strip must be demilitarized , with the sole exception of small firearms for the Palestinians security forces (whose number should be decided by the Quartet on the Middle East – also known as the Diplomatic Quartet or Madrid Quartet and comprising of the United Nations , the United States , the European Union and Russia – and under no circumstances resemble a regular or guerilla army in terms of numbers and equipment) . As for the civilian population , generally , items and supplies of medical or nutritious nature are the cornerstone of improving the quality of life in the former occupied territories and therefore easing tensions and destructive/suicidal tendencies . The same is true for basic infrastructure amenities like electricity and clean water .
The Israeli research institute Reut (http://reut-institute.org/) , in a summary table of its document towards the Winograd Committee – a commission of inquiry into the events of military engagement in the 2006 Lebanon War – entitled ‘Gaps between Israel’s National Security Concept and the Emerging Reality’ states that Israel’s National Security Concept is to ‘Strengthen the existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state by ending its control over the Palestinians based on the principle of two states for two nations. This reality will be realized either through agreements or unilateral moves.’ . The leading logic behind Israel’s grand strategy ‘is based on its military supremacy in every arena in which it acts, alongside reliance on its alliance with the US. This supremacy is supposed to effectively deter or achieve a decisive defeat in case of armed conflict. The political logic fulfills a secondary position only’ (http://reut-institute.org/data/uploads/PDFVer/20070422%20Winograd%20-%20Content%20Table.pdf) . That thesis is common among the political advisors and military analysts of Israel and reveals the chasm between the political procedures and the military operations .
The notion that violence is the solution to any problem is wrong since it repeats a vicious cycle of action-reaction , without offering answers to the root causes of conflict . Fear does not lead to restraint , let alone acceptance . In this particular rivalry there is no prospect of a decisive tactical military victory . Israelis and Palestinians are and shall continue to be neighbours . Palestinians cannot erase Israel and throw its citizens to the sea or reverse history , just as Jews cannot make the Palestinians disappear or abandon their present homeland and aspirations for a Palestinian state . And after sixty years of pitiless struggle , my evaluation is that the majority of the common folk of the two nations just wish for an honest negotiation and peace . If the leaders manage to look past the stereotypes and the emotional need to prove themselves tough – following in the steps of previous leaders who ruled under fundamentally different circumstances – a compromise can be achieved . Repeating a tested method removes the responsibility of having to decide anew and for yourself , but what was right shall not necessarily be valid in the present since every strategy has its limitations , its pros and cons . In conclusion , no mediator or ally knows what is best for another nation . Neither can it enforce it effectively in the long term . And the power , military or otherwise , can easily be a double-edged sword . As has happened before , an agreement can come apart at the hinge , despite the expressed consensus of the signatories . All it takes is a fanatic warrior , a mentally unstable voter or even a third actor who wishes to sabotage the peace process . The only countermeasures is the dedication to the common goal and the ability to discern the single incidents from an organized plan , the greater good instead of the personal political gain , in hope of avoiding the eventuality to resort to hostilities for another sixty years .
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