Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations and the triangle of Greece-Israel-Cyprus

Του Βουχιούνη Νικόλαου , Διεθνολόγου

Τρίτη 20 Σεπτεμβρίου 2011

From its establishment in 1923, the modern Turkish state has exploited its geographical position between east and west in order to maximize its political (influence) and economic (foreign aid and investments) gains and become a regional great power. Comprising the six principles of its founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and specifically

i) Secularism = the segregation between religion and political/state affairs

ii) Nationalism = the creation of a common national identity and the assimilation of minorities

iii) Populism = the participation and mobilization of the Turkish people towards the fulfillment of major reforms

iv) Statism = the nationalization of the critical sectors of the economy, such as the military industry and the financial institutions

v) Republicanism = the division of judicial, executive and legislature branches, under a Constitution

vi) Revolutionism = the enforcement of changes in traditions and social norms, with the goal of modernizing the habits of the common citizen as well as the everyday economic and social interactions

the Turkish Republic managed to present itself as a non-theocratic, rational international actor, willing to adopt the western economic and political system.

During the Cold War, Turkey was the first line of defense between Soviet communism and the unstable Middle East. After the end of the bi-polar age, the ally of the United States has been pursuing a more independent foreign policy. Turkey tried to acquire a leading role among the new founded nation-states of South Caucasus and Central Asia (former Soviet Republics with predominantly Muslim population) and, in a smaller extent, the Balkans. Lack of resources, in combination with the complexity of inter-state relations and the interest of much more powerful actors like the USA / European Union / Russia, condemned the Turkish effort to poor results, if not downright failure. It was a characteristic example of over-extension and miscalculation, as the new countries were ‘security-consumers’ and preferred to place their bets on tested political/military units of the international system.

Since the ascent to power of the Justice and Development Party in 2002, led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has adopted the foreign policy recommendations of professor Ahmet Davutoglu, envisioning a broader role in the global affairs and reshaping its approach to the Middle East. The most notable example is the critical stance against Israel, together with the support expressed for the Palestinians. Despite the historical differences between Turks and Arabs and in view of the rather ambiguous stance of the latter (rhetorical statements instead of practical help and diplomatic initiatives), Turkey seems to challenge the Israeli supremacy and imitate Naser’s Egypt as a representative of a pan-Arabic sentiment/demand for justice and decisive actions in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The impressive annual economic growth rate of approximately 3,8% from 1999 till 2011 and the reduction of unemployment rate from 20% in 2005 to almost 10% in 2011, in an era when the advanced economies of Western Europe seem to lose ground and give in to recession, explains the diminished interest of Turkey to join the experiment of European integration - a reaction related also to the misleading and contradictory official positions of the already member-states of the EU. In that regard, it is only logical that Turkey invests political capital to regional Islamic organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) , whose Secretary General is since 2005 the Turkish Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, and allies itself with countries considered by many as rogue-states (with the most noticeable being Iran and Syria). Those ties are furthermore a preventive diplomatic step against probable Kurdish designs for independence, a prospect that would endanger Turkey’s territorial integrity in the Anatolia region.

The deterioration of relationships with the Jewish homeland almost forced the formation of the geostrategic triangle between Greece-Israel-Cyprus, with the blessings of the United States. That development may have been accelerated by the Arab Spring and the prevalence of religious (potentially anti-Semitic) elements in the post-revolutionary government bodies. In the foreseeable future, that particular alliance will refer to economic transactions and joint investments in the energy sector (natural gas and oil undersea reserves). Neither Greece nor Cyprus are looking forward a new crisis in the east Mediterranean. Even the smallest incident, if it escalates, can be a destructive burden to the economy. With Greece struggling to avoid bankruptcy and Cyprus coming round from the worst military accident in its recent history (i.e. the explosion at Mari Naval Base), economic reforms and political/social stability are more essential than hasty diplomatic movements in the transnational issues with the successor of the Ottoman Empire. The same applies for Israel, which feels once more surrounded by unpredictable forces (such as the post-Mubarak Egypt, under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood) and therefore reacts cautiously and in a non-provocative manner to inflammatory statements or violent protests by enraged mobs. However, the special relationship that Israel enjoys with the United States guarantees the non-intervention of Turkey, in spite of its tendency towards unilateral actions whenever it discerns a ‘window of opportunity’. Israel, after all, has a stronger tradition of protecting its national interest through military rather than diplomatic means. On the other hand, modern Turkey has a history of using its military power not on open conflict or full scale war but as pressure to challenge the current status quo, through either insinuated threats of use of force or careful, repeated moves of border/agreement violations. That tactic is first and foremost applied in the Aegean sea, where Ankara denies Greece’s right to extend its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles (as allowed by the International Law of the Sea) and contests Greek sovereignty over inhabited islands and uninhabited islets (establishing ‘grey zones’ and preventing the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone). The only exception to that strategy took place in 1974, with the Turkish invasion and occupation of Northern Cyprus, partly provoked by a failed coup by the Greek military dictatorship (a.k.a. Junta) against the elected Greek-Cypriot President Makarios (for not aligning with the whims of Junta).

It is unclear at this point whether Greece and Cyprus, apart from their common strategic dogma, will form a defense consortium with Israel, since not only there are implications due to their membership to the European Union but more importantly they are the weak link in comparison with Israel, meaning that the relationship would be (at first glance) asymmetrical and disadvantageous to Tel Aviv. Still, one cannot exclude the aforementioned possibility, if such a commitment is required to facilitate the Israeli investment to proven reserves of critical natural resources throughout the Aegean. The anticipated participation of American or Israeli-American companies (already announced for the Leviathan Field) puts the whole operation under the umbrella of the United States government and further narrows Turkish options of interference.

In conclusion, Turkey shall not go so far as to defy the United States and certainly already risks a lot by meddling in the Middle East, an area where intrigue and antagonism prevail. Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia aren’t just going to step aside and let Turkey cultivate public relations with their populations or be dragged to foreign policy choices that aren’t theirs. Persians and Arabs alike have reached a modus vivendi with Israel and neither side seems eager to smash it all to pieces, even though there are popular demands for a bottom-up re-evaluation of the specifics of these arrangements / peace agreements . Once more Turkey faces the dilemma of over-extension and will have to tread lightly between symbolic moves and actual threats. Israel has survived much more difficult situations and, speaking from a historical perspective, it remains more than capable to defend its strategic interests. Greece and Cyprus face the danger of becoming the scapegoats of a failed neo-ottoman irredentism and, therefore, have not the luxury of disregarding any bilateral or multilateral coalition that would bolster their economic, military or political / diplomatic attributes. For now, the regional sub-systems of east Mediterranean and Middle East enjoy a fragile balance of power.